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Recovery Swaps 
We derive an arbitrage free relationship between recovery swap rates, digital default swap 
spreads and conventional CDS spreads, and argue that the fair forward recovery rate used in 
recovery swaps must contain a convexity premium over the expected recovery value.  
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RECOVERY SWAP CONTRACTS 
Recovery swaps are the most recent innovation in the credit derivatives market. In this 
contract, two counterparties agree to exchange the realized recovery vs. the preset recovery 
value (recovery swap rate) in case of default, with no other payments being made in any other 
scenario. The typical recovery swaps have no running or upfront payments of any kind. In 
keeping with the swaps nomenclature, the counterparties are denoted as the “payer” and 
“receiver” of the realized recovery rate, correspondingly. From a payer’s perspective, the 
payoff will be positive when the realized recovery is less than the preset swap rate level. 
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Recovery swaps allow investors to eliminate the uncertainty of the future recovery payment 
which is present in the conventional (i.e. floating recovery) CDS, whose protection payment 
in case of default depends on the post-default price of the reference obligation. In a sense, one 
might also call these contracts “recovery forwards” because they operate similarly to, for 
example, an FX forward contract which allows investors to eliminate the uncertainty about 
the future FX rate. Such a name would also emphasize the fact that their payoff is linear in 
terms of the future realized (i.e. “spot”) recovery rate. However, we will follow the lingo 
which is closer to the CDS market and continue calling these contracts “recovery swaps”. 
The market for recovery swaps is driven primarily by the hedging needs of synthetic CDO 
investors and other structured credit market participants. The reason why they need recovery 
swaps is that the pricing and risk management of these more complex securities depends 
separately on the default event risk and recovery risk. This is in contrast with the on-the-run 
(par) conventional CDS contracts whose value depends on the combination of the two risk 
factors – the default loss risk. 
Consider, for example, a synthetic CDO tranche. Most models that price these tranches must 
rely on some assessment of the joint risk-neutral default probability between various 
underlying names. This joint default probability is a non-linear function of individual default 
probabilities of each name and some measure of their correlation, usually incorporated via a 
copula-based framework.  
The individual implied default probabilities must be calibrated to the observed conventional 
CDS spreads. It is this calibration which induces a strong dependence between the assumed 
recovery rate and the single-name implied default probability. The relationship between the 
two can be loosely summarized by the so-called “credit triangle” formula: 
[2]     ( ) Recovery-1 y ProbabilitDefault  Risk  LossDefault   Spread  CDS ×=≈  
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When calibrated to a given observed spread level, the implied default probability will be 
higher for higher values of assumed recovery rate. This implied default probability will then 
become an input into complex correlated default calculations used to price the synthetic CDO 
tranche. The same recovery value will be applied in the very end when figuring out the loss 
distribution on the tranche, but the dependence has been broken – the loss distribution on the 
tranche will no longer depend just on the default loss ratio, but separately on each individual 
default probability and each recovery rate. Consequently, the tranche values and risk 
measures also depend both explicitly, and implicitly, via calibration, on the recovery rate 
assumptions for underlying names. 
In fact, this dependence is not unique to the tranche products, but is generally the case for 
most structured credit products and even off-the-run conventional CDS with non-zero mark-
to-market and non-par cash credit bonds. In all these cases there are so called “digital” default 
risks which are characterized by a given fixed dollar loss in case of default. For example, in 
case of an off-market CDS with positive mark-to-market the current present value on the CDS 
represents a digital default risk because this unrealized gain will disappear without 
compensation if the underlying name defaults immediately. 
For many years, there existed a small niche in the credit derivatives market which catered to 
clients who needed to hedge such digital risks. The so-called digital default swaps (DDS) 
differ from the more conventional liquid CDS by pre-setting contractually the value of the 
protection payment in case of default. This contractual protection payment is usually quoted 
in terms of “contractual recovery” rate, which could be set at any number. If it was set at zero, 
then a protection buyer would get a payment equal to the full notional in case of default. If it 
was set at 50%, then the protection buyer would get a payment equal to half of the notional.  
One of the main uses of DDS was the risk management of corporate accounts receivables, 
operational risks and other such exposures whose value is not naturally tied to the price of the 
underlying issuer’s bonds or traded loans. Unlike asset managers or banks who need to hedge 
the losses on a corporate bond or loan portfolios and thus find the conventional floating rate 
CDS the most natural proxy, the corporate treasurers who need to hedge the specific dollar 
exposure to a trading counterparty have found the DDS to be better suited (even though often 
not liquid enough due to a niche nature of that market).  
With the advent of the recovery swaps the toolkit for separate hedging of credit risks is 
becoming more complete: 
• Default loss risk (i.e. full credit risk with mark-to-market exposure): hedged by 
conventional (floating recovery) CDS 
• Default event risk: hedged by digital default swaps, i.e. DDS 
• Recovery rate risk: hedged by recovery swaps 
• Credit risk without mark-to-market exposure: hedged by constant maturity 
default swaps (CMDS) 
• Spread volatility risk: hedged by (short-term) credit default swaptions 
The conventional CDS still remain the linchpin of the credit derivatives market and continue 
to account for the majority of all traded notionals, according to the most recent survey by the 
British Bankers Association. But the existence of the expanded toolkit also implies certain 
connections and (partial) substitution ability between various credit derivatives instruments.  
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ARBITRAGE-FREE PRICING OF RECOVERY SWAPS 
Recovery swaps can be fully replicated by a combination of conventional and digital CDS. 
This replication, as usual, implies an arbitrage-free relationship between these three 
instruments which we will derive below.  
Consider a zero-investment composite trade depicted in Figure 1: a payer recovery swap with 
the fixed swap rate R(swap), and a long-short position where an investor bought a digital 
default protection with contractual recovery  and sold protection via conventional CDS.  DDSR
The hedge ratios for the DDS and CDS should be chosen so that the net cash flows are zero in 
all scenarios. Consider the case of default: 
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In order to guarantee that these cash flows are equal to zero regardless of the realized 
recovery rate, one must have: 
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Because the cash flows in case when the trades mature without default are identically zero, 
and because the replication requirement for the case of default uniquely fixes both hedge 
ratios, then the comparison of the premium cash flows results in an arbitrage-free relationship 
between the recovery swaps, CDS and DDS.  
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Indeed, if the quoted DDS spread were less (greater) than this value, then this trade would 
have positive (negative) premium cash flows and zero cash flows otherwise, i.e. there will be 
an arbitrage.  
Recalling that the spread for a DDS with zero contractual recovery encodes the term structure 
of implied hazard rates and interest, we can interpret equation [5] as a fully consistent 
generalization of the widely quoted “credit triangle” formula ( )swapCDS RSh −= 1  for 
arbitrary term structures of interest and hazard rates.  
Figure 1. Recovery Swap replication using Digital and conventional CDS 
 Notional Premium Payoff in case of 
default 
Payoff when no 
default 
Payer Recovery Swap  1   -   R(swap)-R  -  
Buy: Digital CDS  H(DDS)   -S(DDS)  1 - R(DDS)  - 
Sell: Conventional CDS  H(CDS)   +S(CDS)  - (1-R)   -  
Net Payments   H(CDS)*S(CDS)-
H(DDS)*S(DDS)  
R(swap)-R          
-H(CDS)*(1 – R) + 
H(DDS)(1 - R(DDS)) 
 -  
 
November 2004 3 
Berd | Recovery Swaps   
 
 
November 2004 4 
Based on this understanding, it would be natural to think that the recovery swap rates should 
be used for calibration of the implied hazard rates in the risk-neutral framework. To prove 
this, assume that we have observed the term structure of CDS spreads and recovery swap 
rates for a range of maturities [0, T]. According to [5] we can obtain without any further 
assumptions the term structure of DDS spreads with zero contractual recovery. The pricing of 
such DDS depends solely on the term structure of risk-neutral survival probabilities (and 
possibly on the correlation of the default process and the risk-free discount factor). 
In a very general form, the pricing of a zero contractual recovery DDS is given by: 
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Here, we have substituted the no-arbitrage DDS spread in terms of the market-observed CDS 
spreads and recovery swap from eq. [5]. The variable τ  denotes the (random) default time, 
 denotes an indicator function for a random event X,  is the (random) credit risk-free 
discount factor, and 
{ }XI uZ
{ }•Ε t  denotes the expectation under the risk-neutral measure at time t . 
For convenience in notations, we have adopted an approximation of continuous DDS 
premium payments (this approximation is irrelevant for the subsequent discussion). 
Under the assumption of independence between the default process and the risk-free rates, the 
expectations of the discount factor and the default indicator factor out. We have 
, where ( ) { ut ZutZ Ε=, } ( )utZ ,
⎜⎝
⎛− ∫ut h
 is the (non-random) riskless discount factor (i.e. the 
prices of the zero-coupon credit risk-free bonds). Introducing the term structure of survival 
probabilities and hazard rates according to the standard reduced-form valuation methodology 
, we get: ( ) { }Ε= <ut IutQ , τ{ } ( ) ⎟⎠⎞⋅= dssexp
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One can easily calibrate the term structure of implied hazard rates to the market-observed 
CDS spreads and recovery swap rates from [7] without making any additional assumptions 
about the recovery and default process. For example, in the case of flat CDS spreads, 
recovery swap rates and hazard rates one immediately obtains the “credit triangle” ( )swapCDS RSh −= 1 . 
We see that the calibration procedure for the implied hazard rates is completely independent 
of our assumptions regarding the correlation between the recovery rates and default events. 
While there is plenty of empirical evidence of a negative correlation between default rates and 
recovery rates (see Altman et. al. [2002]), one can prove from [7] that the calibrated implied 
hazard rate has the exact opposite behavior – it is a growing function of recovery swap rates, 
given a level of observed CDS spreads. This is particularly obvious in the case when the 
credit triangle formula applies.  
Note also that in our derivation of the equations [6] and [7] we did not make an assumption 
about the existence of a liquid DDS market – it is sufficient to assume that the CDS and 
recovery swaps markets exist, and price the hypothetical DDS based on the known arbitrage-
free relationship between the DDS and CDS spreads [5].  
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As we explained, the recovery swaps are typically traded in a “par” format, i.e. with no 
upfront or premium payments. The present value of such a swap is zero at inception. 
However, its present value will generally be not zero after the inception as the market 
recovery rates fluctuate and move away from the contract fixed rate. Consider a (receiver) 
recovery swap with a contractual swap rate , and assume that the current market rate 
for the recovery swap of the same maturity is . The present value of this swap is: 
swapR
mktR
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where  is the (random) realized recovery rate in case of default. The last line in this 
equation is obtained by noting that the first term in the second line is related to the current 
market recovery rate, which is the rate that would have made the present value equal to zero. 
uR
Comparing the last line in [8] with the equation [6] and recalling the definition of the risky 
PV01 for conventional CDS (see O’Kane and Turnbull [2003]), we finally obtain: 
[9] ( )mktCDSCDS
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swapmkt
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Here we have explicitly acknowledged that the RiskyPV01 is a function of the observed 
current CDS spreads and recovery swap rates since it depends on the implied hazard rates 
which in turn must be calibrated to  and  as discussed previously. The present 
value of a payer recovery swap is obviously given by the same formula with an opposite sign. 
Note that we have not made any assumptions about the dependence between the (risk-neutral) 
interest rates, realized recovery rates and defaults in deriving the equation [9]. 
CDSS mktR
THE CONVEXITY PREMIUM 
Practitioners often use the empirical expected recovery rate (e.g. the long-term average rate of 
40%) in calibration of the implied survival probabilities. We now know that it is the market-
observed recovery swap rates that must play the role of the risk-neutral recovery parameter 
when relating the DDS and CDS spreads [5] and when calibrating the implied hazard rates to 
CDS spreads [7]. However, in the absence of a liquid two-way recovery swap market the 
price discovery for recovery rates is still in its infancy and one might ask a question about 
how different should the “fair” recovery swap rate be from the expected average (whether this 
means expected under real or risk-neutral probability measure). 
Equation [9] reveals an important feature of the recovery swaps that might shed some light on 
the answer to this question. We see that the dependence on the market recovery rate is not 
linear – the market rate enters not only the difference term in the numerator which reflects the 
contract payoff structure, but also the denominator and the risky PV01 factor. The latter two 
dependencies reflect the calibration feedback, which can also be interpreted as a convexity 
effect if the recovery swap rates are assumed to be equal to expected recovery rates. 
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Consider what would happen to the mark-to-market of a receiver recovery swap if the market 
recovery rate dropped while the market CDS rates remained unchanged. The investor would 
record a negative mark-to-market as she would expect that the (floating) recovery payment 
will be now less than previously fixed contract recovery rate which she would pay out in case 
of default. At the same time, the implied default rate calibrated to the unchanged CDS spreads 
will now be lower, and the expected likelihood of default prior to maturity will also decrease, 
partially offsetting the loss. Similarly, an upward revision to the expected recovery rate would 
produce a higher implied default probability and a greater likelihood of a positive payoff.1 
Thus, the investor in a receiver recovery swap benefits from both up and downward changes 
in the market recovery rate compared to the contractual linear payoff estimate – which is a 
manifestation of the recovery convexity. Being long such convexity has a positive value, 
therefore the fair value of the swap rate at which the investor can agree to deal is somewhat 
higher than the expected future rate. In the rest of the paper we will try to estimate this 
convexity correction in a heuristic manner. 
Let us consider a receiver recovery swap with inception at time t, maturity at time T at some 
intermediate time t<u<T prior to expiry. The (zero) present value of the par recovery swap is 
equal to the present value of the payoff scenarios when the default happens prior to the time u 
plus the discounted present value of the remaining “live” recovery swap mark-to-market 
values averaged over the random market recovery rates  and CDS spreads 
 at time u. The first portion is simply equal to the present value of a recovery 
swap with a shorter maturity u estimated at the initial date t, which leads us to:  
( TuR , )
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It is difficult to draw a specific conclusion from this relationship in full generality. However, 
if we make certain simplifying assumptions we may be able to estimate the convexity effect. 
Let us assume that the interest rates are conditionally independent of the market recovery 
swap rates and CDS spreads given the survival up to time u. Let us also ignore the 
dependence of the risky PV01 on the level of spreads and recovery rates – both of these 
dependencies are of second order of magnitude compared to the primary dependence captured 
by the pre-factors in front of the risky PV01. Finally, let us assume that the term structure of 
recovery swap rates is flat. Under these assumptions we get the following solution: 
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1 As noted in the previous section, these statements are not at all dependent on the assumptions about the correlation 
between the recovery rate and default events. 
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The second equation is expressed in terms of zero recovery DDS spreads, using [5]. 
The equation [11] potentially depends on the time u on the right hand side, but not on the left 
hand side – this is an artifact of our simplifying assumptions, ignoring small second order 
effects. What this means is that we must estimate the equation [11] at a “typical” intermediate 
time before maturity and assume (or verify) that the time dependence is very mild indeed. 
One can immediately see from [11] that the relationship between the recovery swap rates and 
risk-neutral expected recovery rates does in fact strongly depend on our assumptions about 
the co-movement between the market recovery rates and spreads under the risk-neutral 
measure. For example, one could make an assumption that the zero-recovery DDS spreads 
and recovery rates are conditionally independent given survival until u, and immediately 
obtain a simple answer which would of course be fully consistent with the assumption of both 
flat recovery rate term structure and of mild (or no) dependence on intermediate time u. 
[12]     ( ) ( ){ }τ<Ε= uTuRTtR tswap ,,  
However, such an assumption would go against the grain of the market behavior as we know 
it. In fact, the DDS market is practically non-existent and if anything, the DDS spreads are set 
(not independently discovered) by market makers using the relationship [5] with the liquid 
CDS spreads and the (estimates of or market values of) recovery rates as primary inputs. 
Given this state of affairs, and also the fact the of the three types of securities, the 
conventional CDS are by far the most liquid and the other two (DDS and recovery swaps) are 
niche markets with limited price discovery, we believe that it is more meaningful to assume 
that the CDS spreads are independent of the market recovery swap rates, conditionally on 
survival until u. Under such an assumption, the relationship between the “fair” recovery swap 
rates today and their expected values in the future is more complex: 
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If we further assume a stationary distribution of recovery swap rates (which could follow, for 
example, from a mean-reverting dynamics and would be consistent with the requirement of 
the mild time dependence), then we can calculate the “fair” recovery swap rate based on the 
parameters of such a distribution. For example, assuming that the (risk-neutral) distribution of 
future market recovery rates is close to a normal with a mean R  and a (relatively narrow) 
standard deviation Rσ , we get: 
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The second term on the right hand side is the amount by which the “fair” recovery swap rate 
exceeds the expected recovery rate – i.e. the convexity premium. 
The convexity premium for the recovery swap rate is intimately related with the DDS digital 
premium discussed in Berd and Kapoor (2002) where we have argued that the fair DDS 
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spread must be somewhat higher than what one would obtain using the expected (no-
premium) recovery rates in [5]. Substituting [14] into [5] we obtain the “fair” DDS spread, 
which coincides with our estimate in the cited paper2: 
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The uncertainty about the recovery value can be quite high, in the 10-20% range, even when 
conditioned on the current state of the economy (and much higher unconditionally over long 
periods of time). For the typical levels of expected recovery rate of senior unsecured debt  
(around 40%) and recovery uncertainty (around 15%), the estimate for the recovery swap rate 
is 0.4+0.152/(1-0.4)=43%, i.e. quite a bit higher than the 40% from which we started. Thus, 
the convexity premium effect can have a significant impact on the pricing of both recovery 
swaps and digital default swaps.  
Market practitioners recognize the no-arbitrage relationship [5] between the recovery swaps, 
CDS and DDS, as can be seen from the Figure 2. There, we show recently quoted mid-levels 
for recovery swap rates, CDS and DDS (with contractual R=0) spreads. We also show the 
“implied” recovery rate calculated from the comparison of the CDS and DDS spreads using 
the equation [5]. We can see that the implied recovery swap rate is in line with the quoted 
recovery swap rate (and is well inside the quoted bid-offer spread).  
It is not possible to judge from the Figure 2 whether or not the market recognizes the 
convexity premium in recovery swap rates, because the “expected recovery rate” is not an 
observable quantity. However, investors who use such quotes in conjunction with their own 
estimates of the expected recovery rate (and who agree with our assumptions concerning the 
dynamics of market recovery rates and CDS spreads) should take the convexity premium 
effect into account when deciding whether the recovery swap offers relative value. In 
particular, a recovery swap rate that is higher than the investor’s projection of the expected 
rate may or may not be a sufficient indication of a relative value depending on the estimates 
of the future uncertainty of the recovery rates, in accordance with [14]. However, a recovery 
swap rate that is lower than the investor’s projection would, in our opinion, constitute such a 
relative value because we know that the convexity premium is positive. To monetize this 
opinion, the investor would buy a receiver recovery swap (i.e. pay a lower fixed rate). 
Figure 2. Examples of quoted recovery swap, CDS and DDS rates 
Ticker Recovery 
Swap Rate (%) 
CDS   
(bp) 
DDS(R=0) 
(bp) 
Implied R 
(%) 
CA 34.5 80 122 34.8 
FMC 39.5 174 289 39.7 
GECC 38.0 26 42 38.6 
T 37.0 242 386 37.4 
                                                          
2 The relative DDS spread convexity used in Berd and Kapoor (2002) can be estimated from the “no-premium” DDS 
spread by taking its second derivative with respect to mean recovery rate and leads precisely to [15]  
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In conclusion, we note that if or when recovery swaps become much more liquid, we would 
regard the market-observed recovery swap rates to be the “true” implied recovery value 
subsuming the convexity premium effects, and use it for calibration of implied default rates 
from market-observed CDS spreads – thus bringing the pricing framework for credit 
derivatives firmly into an arbitrage-free setting. There will be no need to worry about the 
differences between the fair recovery swap rate and the expected recovery rate.  
In fact, when independent price discovery in recovery swap rates and CDS spreads becomes 
reality, we can test the independence between these rates instead of simply assuming it, and 
perhaps use the more general version of the equation [11] to estimate the relationship between 
the fair recovery swap rates and the parameters of the joint distribution of future market 
recovery rates and CDS spreads. The equation [5] would continue to govern the relationship 
between the CDS, DDS and recovery swaps. 
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